Explanation, Relevance, and Humean Laws: A Response to Loewer and Lange (2013)

Undergraduate: Jim Dennison

Faculty Advisor: John Roberts
Department: Philosophy

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In this paper, I propose a solution to the self-explanation problem for Humeanism about scientific laws. The self-explanation problem states that Humean laws cannot be used to non-circularly explain particular phenomena, since those phenomena are what explain the Humean laws. I consider a solution proposed by Loewer that relies on distinguishing between scientific and metaphysical explanation. I discuss a problem that Lange raises for Loewer¿s approach, based on his transitivity principle, which states that if A helps metaphysically explain B and B helps scientifically explain C, then A helps scientifically explain C. I argue that any given fact that helps ground a Humean law is irrelevant to that law¿s explanatory power since it is not a difference-maker for its lawhood. Therefore, explanations that appeal to Humean laws do not involve self-explanation. In this argument, I draw on Michael Strevens¿s kairetic account of scientific explanation, which defines explanatory relevance in terms of difference-making.