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Rankin – A Philosophical Analysis of Lower Court Plea Bargains in the United States Criminal Justice System Using Principles of Game Theory

 

A Philosophical Analysis of Lower Court Plea Bargains in the United States Criminal Justice System Using Principles of Game Theory (2024)

Undergraduate: Eleanor Rankin


Faculty Advisor: Matthew Kotzen
Department: Philosophy, Politics, and Economics

The goal of my project was to research how the intersection of philosophy, politics, and economics (PPE) concepts can reveal unique insight into the failings of the United States criminal justice system caused by lower court plea bargains. I compiled philosophical and legal research into a philosophy paper using the following research question: When PPE principles are applied to the controversial components of lower court guilty pleas, what does it reveal regarding the philosophical justification for lower court plea bargains? Using game theoretic tools as the predominate means of PPE principles, my research engaged with and disputed the traditional philosophical and legal reasoning for the use of plea bargains. Ultimately, I argue that when the bargaining power balance is examined in different aspects of misdemeanor plea negotiations, the legal justifications for plea bargaining are philosophically unsound.

Link to Abstract