Strategic Loss Avoidance: Domestic Political Signals and Military Coalition Participation (2012)

Undergraduates: Bradley Smith, none none none

Faculty Advisor: Mark Crescenzi
Department: Political Science

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This study examines how the domestic political conditions of the U.S. affect the likelihood that states will join a U.S.-led military coalition. I contend that the domestic political environment of the U.S. at the time of a coalition’s formation functions as a signal to potential coalition partners, allowing them to discern the intention of the U.S. in seeking to form a multilateral coalition. In turn, I argue that these perceptions of U.S. intent, formed through observation of U.S. domestic politics, shape potential partner states’ predictions of the costs they will incur through coalition participation. I expect that these predictions of cost affect states’ likelihood of coalition participation. As such, this study aims to uncover a hidden aspect of the strategic interaction between the U.S. and friendly states once the U.S. has made clear that it desires to seek multilateralism through the formation of a military coalition. Thus, this research contributes to the growing literature exploring the link between domestic political processes and international interactions. To test this theory, I have compiled a dataset to conduct an empirical test of the influence of congressional opposition, economic conditions, and Presidential election cycles on the likelihood of state participation in every U.S.-led military coalition from 1945-2003. This quantitative empirical analysis provides strong support for the theory of coalition formation that I have developed.