Credible Commitment Problems and Economic Power in South Africa and Zimbabwe (2013)

Undergraduate: Alexandra Van Vliet

Faculty Advisor: Navin Bapat
Department: Peace, War & Defense

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Wars are seen as a puzzle to scholars as they are costly, in terms of monetary costs and lives lost, yet they continue to occur at alarming rates around the world. One theory is that there are credible commitment problems that arise; this occurs when parties in a conflict have perverse incentives that would cause them to renege on a negotiated settlement. Credible commitment problems occurred in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. These two states have historical similarities that make them appropriate to comparatively analyze. Together, these two cases demonstrate my argument that the negotiated settlement in South Africa was durable due to it allowing the white minority to retain their control of the economy. Zimbabwe illustrates the opposing side to that which is that when everything is taken from a minority, the country goes into upheaval and the negotiated settlement no longer holds. Thus, credible commitment problems can be overcome in ethnic intrastate conflicts when the minority is able to have an economic counter-balance to the majority's political power.